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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 7, 1981

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NSC review completed - may be declassified in full

TO : NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz  
 DOD - Mr. Jay Rixse  
 JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell  
 CIA -   
 ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey  
 OMB - Mr. William Schneider

SUBJECT: Senior Interdepartmental Group No. 9: Revised Summary of Issues and Recommendations

Attached is a summary of issues and recommendations agreed to in the October 5 SIG meeting on CBW Arms Control policy. The summary is intended to crystallize the deliberations of the SIG and to form the basis for an options paper or a draft decision directive for White House consideration.

Addressees are requested to review the summary at a senior policy level. Concurrence should be telephoned to Mr. Tain Tompkins, 632-5804. Comments and suggested revisions are requested in writing to this office by COB Friday, October 9.

SIG members will be advised of the outcome of this process by COB October 13.

*L. Paul Bremer, Jr.*  
 L. Paul Bremer, Jr.  
 Executive Secretary

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State Dept. review  
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**SECRET**Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms ControlISSUES FOR DECISION

- How to proceed on the issue of Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) raised by the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk and recent evidence on the use of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast Asia.
- How to proceed with chemical weapons (CW) arms control negotiations.

BACKGROUNDBWC Compliance

The US is a Party to and, together with the UK and USSR, a Co-Depositary for the 1975 Convention prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of BW -- activities which the US unilaterally renounced in 1969. In March 1980, as a result of disturbing new intelligence, the US requested bilateral technical consultations with the Soviets, in accordance with the BWC, regarding concerns that the 1979 outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk was related to activities prohibited by the BWC. The US made six such demarches to the Soviets without receiving an explanation which would satisfactorily resolve US concerns.

In September 1981, the US informed the UN and announced publicly that it had obtained evidence regarding the use of lethal mycotoxins (substances covered by the BWC) in Southeast Asia. On September 23 and 28, Secretary Haig raised the BWC compliance issue with Gromyko in the US/Soviet bilateral discussions at the UN. On October 1, the US followed up these discussions with another demarche, to the Soviet Charge in Washington, detailing US concerns about the use of chemical weapons and mycotoxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and raised once again the matter of the Sverdlovsk incident. The Charge's preliminary response was to reject our concerns as part of a propaganda ploy.

CW Arms Control

Since mid-1977 the US, pursuant to the agreement reached at the 1974 Moscow Summit, has been actively engaged in bilateral US/Soviet negotiations and multilateral efforts in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament (CD) aimed at achieving a complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of CW development, production and stockpiling. Progress was made initially on a number of key issues in the US/Soviet talks. Since 1979, however, the negotiations have been stalled by Soviet intransigence over verification. Additionally, the US retaliatory capability in the CW area, as well as US

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bargaining leverage in the bilaterals, has been eroded in recent years as a result of the Carter Administration's decisions to forego CW modernization. Given the many technical, as well as political, difficulties which remain to be resolved, conclusion of a CW prohibition is not a real possibility for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, a credible US position on CW arms control would effectively counter Soviet propaganda in this area and provide an incentive for Allied, as well as continued Congressional, support for CW modernization.

On October 5, Under Secretary Stoessel chaired a SIG on Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Arms Control policy to consider and agree on appropriate recommendations to the NSC on how to proceed on the BWC compliance issue and on CW arms control. It was agreed that a primary US objective is to ensure that the current CW modernization plans proceed so that the US has a credible and effective retaliatory capability and so that the US can regain negotiating leverage in the area of CW arms control. It was agreed that early NSC decisions on Administration policy in both these areas were necessary in order to enable the US to exercise leadership and play an active and influential role in on-going and upcoming work in international fora on issues which directly affect US and Western security interests. It was recognized that the US would be required to present positions on these issues publicly at this session of the UN General Assembly (which began September 15) and at the beginning of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament (which begins February 2).

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

On BWC compliance, the SIG recommends that the President approve the strategy outlined below to follow-up the demarche to the Soviets made October 1:

- Continue our public information campaign and use the 36th UN General Assembly debate, particularly debate in the First (Political) Committee on the issue of reports of CW use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea, and discussions in the CD and other appropriate international fora to continue to expose the CBW activities of the Soviets and their friends to international scrutiny and criticism;
- Support convening a meeting of States Parties to the BWC to seek to strengthen its verification and compliance mechanisms in light of Soviet non-compliance, and to provide an additional forum for maintaining international pressure on the Soviets about their CBW activities; and

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- After assessing the results of the steps above, the Administration would consider the possibility of utilizing the final two remedies provided by the BWC -- i.e., taking the issue to the UN Security Council for action (an effort the Soviets will certainly veto) and/or withdrawing from the BWC.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

In addition, the SIG tasked the IG to analyze, and submit recommendations for approval on, specific measures to strengthen the verification and compliance provisions of the BWC.

On CW arms control, the SIG recommends that the President approve a US policy which:

- supports the objective of concluding a complete and verifiable prohibition of CW production, development and stockpiling; and
- while allowing the US/Soviet negotiations to lapse informally, supports CW arms control discussions in the CD, leading to multilateral CD negotiations on a CW prohibition (based on interagency study and SIG approval of a strengthened U.S. negotiating position).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

In addition the SIG tasked the IG to complete a study, and submit appropriate recommendations for SIG approval before February 1982, on US positions on strengthened verification requirements, requirements for declarations of CW stocks and production facilities, and requirements for entry-into-force of a CW agreement.

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